The NDC Paradox: Rising ambition, rising temperatures

As summer progresses, India is experiencing unprecedented heat, solidifying its status as one of the hottest regions globally this season. The phenomenon of temperatures consistently surpassing 40 degrees Celsius has transitioned from an anomaly to the new norm.

In April 2026, according to AQI, the world’s top 50 hottest cities are in India, led by Banda in Bundelkhand, UP, Amravati in Maharashtra, and  Kanpur again in UP.

This unsettling trend is not merely a statistic; it raises critical and fundamental questions regarding the effectiveness of ongoing efforts aimed at climate change mitigation and adaptation. 

The rise in temperatures brings to light the pressing need to examine whether the observed climate challenges are the result of misplaced priorities within the climate action sector or indicative of a broader, unfocused approach to addressing climate change.

Countries worldwide have made commitments through their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement, which outlines specific targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

However, the effectiveness of these commitments remains in question as temperatures continue to climb.

It’s essential to assess how well these commitments align with the urgent need for both mitigation strategies—aimed at reducing emissions and slowing climate change—and adaptation strategies, which focus on adjusting to the inevitable impacts of climate change already in motion.

As we grapple with these rising temperatures, we must re-evaluate our strategies and priorities to ensure a more effective and united response to the climate crisis. One of the primary concerns in climate policy is the disparity between the global target for limiting average global warming to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and the specific commitments made by individual countries to meet those ambitious goals.

The Paris Agreement, which was established to address climate change in the 12th December 2015, has seen countries increasingly pledge targets that are more aggressive over time. However, there is a growing scepticism about whether these nations will translate their commitments into meaningful action on a national scale. 

Implementation gaps 

There can be several reasons for a mismatch between the commitment and actions, but one of the key reasons lies in the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), emerging first in Principle 7 of the 1992 Rio Declaration and was incorporated into Article 3.1 of the United Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), making the principle of CBDR-RC a cornerstone of the international climate change legal regime.

This principle has led to concerns about what is termed the “implementation gap.” Beyond finance, CBDR demands something even harder from rich nations — vacating carbon space.

The BASIC group at COP30 called for developed countries to reach net-zero fast, specifically to release carbon space for developing countries — because as long as fossil-fuel-producing developed nations omit phase-out timelines from their own NDCs, the atmospheric budget is consumed before developing nations can exercise their CBDR-guaranteed right to develop.” 

Another important reason for the not-so-successful implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)— as the individual climate action plans developed by countries—faces significant challenges. The dynamics between powerful industries, particularly those linked to fossil fuels like coal, steel, and petroleum, and civil society organisations, environmental advocates, and research think tanks, play a crucial role in shaping climate policies.

While the pro-environment lobby strives for ambitious climate action and policies that prioritise sustainability, the vested interests of industries often complicate and hinder progress. This interplay underscores the complexity of addressing climate change and highlights the need for collaboration between different stakeholders to bridge the implementation gap and ensure effective action toward achieving global climate goals. 

Additionally, another important attribute could be the inconsistent policy mix in achieving the target.  The effectiveness of climate policies depends on their proper implementation at both national and sub-national levels.

Each region has different sources of emissions, which can arise from energy use, land use, agriculture, or transportation. For instance, if emissions are primarily generated from energy use, but policies focus mainly on land use and agriculture, the overall impact on emission reduction will be limited.

Therefore, policies that do not address the main sources of emissions are poorly equipped to tackle existing climate challenges. A notable example is India’s Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) submitted to the UNFCCC for 2035.

India aims to reduce the emissions intensity of its GDP by 47% by 2035 compared to 2005 levels.

Additionally, the country has proposed that 60% of its cumulative electric power installed capacity should come from non-fossil fuel-based energy sources by 2035. However, the commitment lacks a specific plan for phasing out coal, does not address the need for sufficient energy storage development, and overlooks the growing energy demands that hinder deeper decarbonisation.

Furthermore, the NDC does not provide detailed information on sectoral emissions. The inadequate grid infrastructure to utilise currently available clean energy poses another significant challenge.

Merely increasing installed power generation capacity will not enhance climate outcomes unless clean energy options are utilised on a large scale by the general population. 

Global trends 

If we analyse the global trend among countries that have submitted their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement, we see a varied landscape of commitment levels toward reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

Among these, some nations have established particularly ambitious targets.

The United Kingdom stands out with its commitment to achieving an 81% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels by the year 2035.

This significant reduction goal reflects the UK’s concerted efforts to combat climate change and transition toward a more sustainable economy. 

Similarly, the European Union has set an ambitious target as well, aiming for a substantial cut in emissions ranging from 66.25% to 72.5% below 1990 levels by 2035.

This collective approach by EU member states underscores their commitment to a green transition and collaborative action against climate change.

In contrast, China, one of the world’s largest emitters of carbon dioxide, has for the first time announced a target to reduce emissions by 7% to 10% from its peak levels, based on 2005 figures, by the year 2035.

This shift marks a significant milestone for China, indicating a recognition of the need for sustainable practices. In addition, the country has introduced sector-specific targets to facilitate this emissions reduction, emphasising a strategic approach tailored to various industries.

Moreover, the Russian Federation has also made a notable commitment, pledging to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 65% to 67% from 1990 levels by 2035.

This target aligns with global efforts to address climate change and signifies Russia’s engagement in the international dialogue on sustainability.

Base year problem

One of the most consequential yet under-scrutinised contrasts across Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) is the divergence in base years that countries use to measure their emissions reductions. Far from being a technical footnote, the choice of baseline year is a deeply political decision — and several countries have extracted enormous strategic advantage from it.

The adoption of 1990 as the standard base year traces back to the Kyoto Protocol and the original UNFCCC framework. The choice was not arrived at through rigorous scientific reasoning. In fact, the use of deeper historical emissions data was explicitly rejected on practical grounds: reliable, comparable greenhouse gas inventories simply did not exist for most countries before 1990.

The year was thus adopted by convention rather than by design, and its political consequences proved far-reaching. Some countries did not merely benefit from the 1990 baseline — they benefited spectacularly, and through no climate effort of their own. Germany is the most striking case.

The 1990 base year coincided almost exactly with German reunification, which brought the highly polluting, Soviet-era East German industrial economy into the national accounts. When that industry subsequently collapsed following reunification, emissions fell sharply — and Germany was able to count those reductions toward its climate targets, even though they had nothing to do with decarbonisation policy. Russia and several Eastern European economies present an analogous, if even starker, dynamic.

Their 1990 emissions reflected the full weight of Soviet-era heavy industry, which was operating at maximum, highly inefficient output.

When the Soviet Union disintegrated, and those economies contracted through the 1990s, emissions plummeted — again, not as a result of any environmental policy, but as a byproduct of economic collapse.

By anchoring their NDC commitments to this artificially inflated 1990 baseline, these countries effectively locked in large “free” reductions; padding their climate pledges with historical windfalls they had no hand in engineering.

This phenomenon is what climate negotiators have long referred to as “hot air” — commitments that are technically met without requiring any real additional effort.

The developing country case: 

The logic is different for large developing economies. In 1990, countries like India were still in the early stages of industrialisation, and their emissions were only a small fraction of what they would become over the next three decades.

This means that using a 1990 baseline could lead to one of two distortions: either the percentage reductions would seem deceptively large compared to a very low starting point, which would overstate their ambition, or, if they were required to make the same proportional cuts as developed nations, it would impose unfair constraints on their right to develop.

This would penalise them for their lower emissions in 1990, rather than for any substantial contribution to the climate problem. Despite the shortcomings, the NDC can be a wonderful blueprint to know and understand the progress made by the respective countries in the direction of climate change.

However, the linear approach of centralised decision-making from top to bottom, supported by the siloed nature of several institutions from the Indian point of view, is one of the strongest stumbling blocks in achieving the full potential of NDCs.  i.e., Agriculture ministries may plan for crop yields. Water ministries plan for irrigation.

Disaster management authorities plan for emergency response. Social protection departments plan for social protection and caregiver schemes.

However, the NDCs require integrated, cross-sectoral action — there is a need for an institutional architecture for such integration at the national and below the national level. 

An increase in informed coordination, with better data integration, policy analysis, and reporting from several sectoral developments across the departments, along with a flexible budget, would be good for integrated climate-resilience programming.   

Conclusion 

The challenge before the global community is no longer the absence of climate ambition. It is the absence of implementation, integration, and accountability.

Nationally Determined Contributions remain valuable roadmaps, but roadmaps alone do not reduce emissions, protect vulnerable communities, or cool rising temperatures. Unless climate governance evolves beyond sectoral silos and political symbolism toward integrated action, future summers may continue to break records while climate pledges remain comfortably on paper.

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