Vietnam’s diplomatic strategy in managing China

When the world is witnessing highly destructive wars to resolve differences, Vietnam’s dexterity in managing its differences with China without bloodshed offers an instructive model in diplomacy to deal with a powerful neighbour with an expansionist approach. Hanoi’s approach is based on pragmatism and strategic clarity. It understands that managing China is not a choice but a permanent strategic condition. Its broad strategy is not to defeat China but to live alongside it without sacrificing its autonomy or national interests. Hence, Hanoi’s approach is neither submissive nor confrontational. Instead, it is a calibrated balancing act, combining firm resistance with measured restraint.  

There are serious differences between the two countries on several issues. The main difference is on territorial claims in the South China Sea (SCS)/East Sea (ES). China claims almost 90% area of SCS/ES. Its nine-dash line keeps on expanding. It has created artificial islands and turned them into military outposts. To assert its claims, Beijing has changed the traditional names of several features. This is an ongoing activity. Beijing’s aggressive patrolling in areas belonging to Vietnam is common. In 2014, China placed a giant oil rig in waters claimed by Vietnam near the Paracel Islands. It objected to Vietnam’s drilling operations along with foreign countries. Often confrontation takes place. There had been incidents of Beijing forces sinking Vietnam’s fishing boats. However, Vietnam does not allow these incidents to escalate into a war. This restraint, however, does not imply acquiescence. Hanoi has firmly resisted China’s expansive claims, upheld UNCLOS, and supported the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration Ruling. Hanoi remains the most vocal opponent of the Chinese illegal claims.

Beyond maritime disputes, tensions also arise from China’s upstream dams on the Mekong River, which affect water flows and agricultural livelihoods in Vietnam’s delta.  Hanoi has also approached China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with caution, mindful of potential risks related to debt, dependence, and strategic vulnerability. 

Differences extend to broader regional dynamics. While Beijing seeks a China-centric regional order, Hanoi advocates ASEAN centrality and sovereign equality among states. On global alignments, China views the US as its principal strategic rival, whereas Vietnam sees engagement with Washington as essential for its economic growth and security diversification. 

Vietnam’s ties with China need to be seen in the backdrop of Lam’s integrated vision of diplomacy that aligns national security, economic growth, and long-term strategic planning. Vietnam’s foreign policy aims to secure stability, attract investment, and build sustainable frameworks for cooperation. He perceives that partnerships with other countries are central to Hanoi’s objectives of developing its manufacturing capabilities, ensuring the supply of its energy requirements, and accessing new markets. He believes that Vietnam’s development cannot take place in isolation: it is integrated with regional development. 

While Lam is pursuing Bamboo diplomacy, he has elevated it to a comprehensive doctrine of statecraft, blending security, economic policy, and international engagement with strategic confidence. Vietnam’s statecraft under him establishes that constructive engagement between different systems remains achievable. It offers a counter-model to the zero-sum rivalries of major powers.  

Lam’s pragmatic diplomacy also understands certain limits. First, Vietnam alone cannot militarily balance China. Second, open alignment against China is not necessary in view of its economic ties. Third, wars have tremendous cost, which could seriously damage its ongoing development progress. 

Hence, his policy is to diplomatically manage the differences with China, while maintaining its independence. It is based on three components. First, engage China to avoid conflict or escalation of tension. The party-to-party and govt.-to-govt. links and ASEAN structure are skilfully used. Second, diversify partnerships to avoid over-dependence. Vietnam now has strategic partnership with 38 countries. This creates counterweights without formal containment. Third, assert sovereignty and strategic autonomy without provoking China.  

The telephonic conversation in January between Lam and Xi Jinping illustrates how the former is managing Beijing. Describing Vietnam’s priorities decided at the 14th National Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party, Lam stated that Vietnam is determined to build a peaceful, independent, democratic, prosperous, civilised and happy nation, steadily advancing towards socialism in a new era of development. He underscored Vietnam’s unwavering commitment to national independence and socialism, a people-centred development approach, a new growth model and an independent, self-reliant foreign policy of peace, friendship, cooperation and development, alongside diversification and multilateralisation of external relations. He called for breakthroughs in practical cooperation, urging expanded imports (especially of Vietnamese agricultural and aquatic products), prioritisation of railway cooperation, enhanced high-quality investment tied to technology transfer and workforce training and enhanced science and technology cooperation. Thus, he stressed the importance of national interests.   

He also reaffirmed that Vietnam would continue to prioritise developing relations with China, emphasising that Vietnam-China ties should continue to serve as a stable, long-term pillar with deep strategic links to indicate that there was no change in Hanoi’s approach toward Beijing. He assured Vietnam’s adherence to “One China” policy and that Vietnam held high regard for China’s role as a responsible major country for regional and global peace and development. He proposed elevating political trust to guide comprehensive cooperation.  

Lam, in an article in April 2025, stated the above dimensions but avoided any mention of controversial issues. His management of China reflects his depth of understanding of bilateral issues and realism. He knows that some of the issues need not be over stressed in bilateral talks, while making the best use of available options to meet Hanoi’s requirements of technology, trade and investment and achieve its objectives of 2030. His stress on ASEAN was clearly indicated by the fact that he went to ASEAN countries (Indonesia and Singapore) after taking over as the General Secretary of VCP. Later he went to Central Asia, North Korea and Russia.

In view of the above, Lam’s forthcoming visit in mid-April to Beijing is likely to focus on reinforcing the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with agreements on trade, investment and technological cooperation. While concerns may be raised, he would ensure that they would not disturb overall ties to utilise available opportunities to meet Vietnam’s requirements. Lam’s statecraft is pushing steadily Hanoi’s ascent as a confident middle power capable of navigating a complex global environment and crafting outcomes to achieve its objectives, while avoiding provocation that can escalate tension. 

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