India’s ‘no first use’ nuclear doctrine needs a reset in an age of reckless rhetoric

In an era already strained by great-power rivalry and regional instability, the re-emergence of nuclear brinkmanship in South Asia should alarm the world. What was once considered unthinkable—the casual invocation of nuclear use—is increasingly entering mainstream political discourse. Nowhere is this more troubling than in rhetoric emanating from Pakistan, where political figures, military leaders, and former diplomats have, with growing frequency, issued statements that blur the line between deterrence and provocation. For India, a country that has long anchored its nuclear doctrine in restraint and responsibility, this evolving environment raises urgent questions about whether its long-standing commitment to No First Use (NFU) remains adequate.

A pattern of nuclear brinkmanship has become increasingly visible in Pakistan’s public discourse. In March 2026, Abdul Basit, Pakistan’s former High Commissioner to India, warned on live television that in a hypothetical U.S.–Pakistan conflict, Islamabad could strike Indian cities like Mumbai and New Delhi “without thinking twice.” Earlier, in May 2025, Khawaja Asif described the possibility of nuclear war with India as a “clear and present” danger. Around the same period, Asim Munir was reported as warning that Pakistan could “take half the world down” if faced with an existential threat. In April 2025, Hanif Abbasi claimed that dozens of nuclear warheads were “kept for India.” Taken together, these remarks—from diplomatic, political, and military leadership—reflect a consistent pattern of nuclear signalling that lowers thresholds and raises serious concerns about escalation stability in South Asia.

The contrast with India’s nuclear posture could not be sharper. Since its 1998 nuclear tests, India has positioned itself as a responsible nuclear power, guided by a doctrine of credible minimum deterrence and anchored in its NFU pledge. This commitment has not merely been declaratory; it has shaped India’s global standing. Despite remaining outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, India has earned international legitimacy through its strong non-proliferation record. The landmark India–United States civil nuclear agreement of 2008 ended decades of technological isolation, opening avenues for civilian nuclear cooperation with partners such as France and others. India’s adherence to export controls and its refusal to engage in horizontal proliferation have distinguished it in a volatile region.

Yet doctrines are not sacred texts; they must evolve with changing realities. Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine has never embraced NFU. Instead, it explicitly reserves the right to use nuclear weapons first, particularly to offset conventional asymmetry with India. The development of tactical nuclear weapons and the signalling of early use in a conflict lowers

the nuclear threshold in ways that India’s doctrine does not fully account for. Combined with increasingly explicit public threats, this creates a deterrence imbalance—one in which India’s restraint risks being interpreted not as strength, but as predictability.

The broader geopolitical environment further complicates this equation. The world is witnessing renewed tensions involving major powers, including conflicts in the Middle East where the possibility of strikes on nuclear infrastructure has re-entered strategic calculations. In such a landscape, nuclear doctrines built solely on clarity and restraint may struggle to deter adversaries who thrive on ambiguity and brinkmanship. Deterrence today is no longer static; it is shaped by perception, signalling, and the credibility of response.

For India, the question is not whether to abandon responsibility, but how to reinforce deterrence without sacrificing its core principles. Strategic thinking within India has already begun to reflect this dilemma. Signals from within the Bharatiya Janata Party and broader policy circles have suggested that the NFU policy is not immutable and may be subject to review. Such a reassessment would not necessarily mean abandoning NFU altogether, but rather adapting it to contemporary realities.

This is where the concept of strategic ambiguity becomes relevant. Strategic ambiguity does not imply recklessness; it is a calibrated approach that introduces uncertainty into an adversary’s calculations. By avoiding absolute commitments, a state preserves flexibility in responding to a range of contingencies. For India, adopting a degree of ambiguity—whether by refining the conditions under which nuclear retaliation might occur or by signalling that extreme circumstances could warrant pre-emptive action—would complicate Pakistan’s strategic calculus and reinforce deterrence.

Importantly, such a shift need not undermine India’s reputation as a responsible nuclear power. On the contrary, it could enhance its credibility among partners who understand the complexities of modern deterrence. The United States has long relied on strategic ambiguity in its own nuclear posture. As India deepens its strategic partnership with Washington—particularly in civilian nuclear energy, defence technology, and advanced research—a more flexible doctrine would align it with contemporary strategic thinking.

India’s potential in civilian nuclear cooperation is equally significant. With one of the world’s largest pools of scientific and engineering talent, India is well positioned to emerge as a hub for nuclear innovation. Collaboration with the United States and like-minded partners such as France offers opportunities not only for energy security but also for technological advancement. In an era of climate transition, nuclear energy remains a critical pillar of sustainable growth, and India’s role in this domain is set to expand.

At the same time, deterrence must remain credible. The stability–instability paradox has long defined South Asia, allowing lower-intensity conflicts to persist under a nuclear umbrella. If Pakistan perceives India’s response as constrained by an unyielding NFU commitment, it may be tempted to engage in riskier behaviour. Introducing strategic ambiguity would raise the perceived costs of such actions, strengthening deterrence at both conventional and nuclear levels.

None of this suggests that India should mirror Pakistan’s rhetoric or abandon its commitment to restraint. The objective is not escalation, but stability. However, stability cannot rest on asymmetry—especially when one side openly signals a willingness to escalate. A doctrine that is overly predictable risks being misinterpreted, and misperception remains one of the gravest dangers in nuclear strategy.

India stands at a strategic inflection point. Its rise as a global power, its deepening partnerships with the West, and its role in shaping the Indo-Pacific order demand a deterrent posture that is both credible and adaptable. Reviewing the No First Use policy, and introducing a measured degree of strategic ambiguity, would not mark a departure from India’s principles. Rather, it would reflect their evolution in a more uncertain and contested world.

In the final analysis, deterrence is not just about weapons; it is about perception, signalling, and resolve. In an age of reckless rhetoric, clarity must be tempered with flexibility—and restraint must be backed by the unmistakable capacity to respond.

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