African countries’ responses to the US–Israel war with Iran: A message for India

African responses to the US–Israel war with Iran have been far from uniform. Africa has not responded under a coordinated leadership of the African Union or any regional bloc. Based on geography and their individual ties with Israel, Iran, the USA, and the Gulf countries, African countries are taking divergent stances.

There is no ideological commonality like ‘non-alignment’ or even a common position on the countries involved in the conflict. Supranational bodies such as the African Union or regional organisations have merely asked for ‘restraint, urgent de-escalation, and sustained dialogue, stressing that all parties must act fully in accordance with international law’. This conflict has serious implications for critical supplies to African countries – including fuel, food, and other essential commodities. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has also made the Red Sea area vulnerable, and the security of many African countries is directly impacted. However, most African countries have shaped their responses and positions based on their own interests and domestic imperatives. Their responses have exposed the limitations of treating Africa as a bloc for external issues or engagement, even on crucial issues like this.

On one side, the Horn of Africa – comprising Somalia, Djibouti, and Eritrea – has criticised Iran for attacking its neighbours and remained muted on the US–Israel war with Iran. The governments of the Horn of Africa have taken a stance that focuses on their strategic ties with the Gulf states. These governments condemned Iran’s strikes on neighbouring states and termed them a clear violation of sovereignty. The reason behind this is clear: Somalia is sensitive to regional politics that include Emirati support for Somaliland. Ethiopia is also relying heavily on security cooperation with Israel and the remittances it receives from its diaspora in the Gulf. This conflict has once again laid bare the power dynamics in the Horn of Africa.

On the other side, South Africa, Nigeria, and others are critical of the US–Israel invasion of Tehran, which has sparked violent protests in Nigeria and created a diplomatic divide. South African President Ramaphosa has even expressed his desire to become a mediator between Iran and Israel. South Africa’s position against Israel has remained clear since it brought the genocide case against Israel to the International Court of Justice. Consequently, its position on the recent conflict is not a new one. Tehran has also offered to let goods for South Africa pass through the Strait of Hormuz on a selective basis, though it is not included in the list of five countries whose vessels will not be stopped by Iran in the Strait of Hormuz.

The Hormuz Strait closure has disrupted oil supplies. Crude oil prices are surging, and African countries will suffer from this low supply of goods. This disruption is choking nearly 20 per cent of global oil and LNG supplies. The prices of crude oil climbed above USD 100 in the first week of March 2026 and peaked at as high as USD 126 during the crisis. Global oil supply has also plunged by at least 8 million barrels per day. There has been an impact on storage capacity and export outlets, which has led to a forced cut in production.

These rising costs will hit African states hard, given their heavy reliance on imported refined petroleum. It has led to soaring transport and production costs – driving up the price of food. There is also a shortage of fertilisers that are produced in the Gulf and transported to Sudan, Somalia, and Kenya. The disruption in Hormuz has caused shippers to reroute vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, entailing longer journeys and higher transport costs.

The Red Sea has once again become a highly volatile and insecure area that is a flashpoint for global power competition, which is deeply worrying for African states, especially the coastal states and the Horn of Africa. Attacks on some commercial ships have amplified the volatility of the Hormuz Strait. This conflict is disrupting the flow of humanitarian aid to millions in Sudan and Yemen, which will further fuel food insecurity. At the same time, coastal African countries are worried that it will invite ever-greater engagement by external powers.

Iran also wields influence in West African countries, with increased support from the Shia community residing in Nigeria and Senegal. The Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) is a Shia group that has aligned with Iranian revolutionary ideology and receives support from Nigerian Shia Muslims. Aware of this kind of support in their country, the Nigerian government has adopted a cautious, balanced approach, calling for de-escalation and restraint. Many West African nations, along with the African Union, have urged calm and the preservation of regional stability. Thus, while Iran’s soft power in the West African region remains high, most African states have opted for diplomatic restraint in the current conflict.

The weakening of international law and the brute use of force, including the strategy for regime change as in the US–Israel–Iran war, has serious security implications for African countries. Due to the presence of the AFRICOM base in Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, many African countries are already apprehensive of such threats. India, which opts for a ‘Peace First’ approach to this conflict, has something to note from African responses. At the fourth India–Africa Forum Summit, which is likely to take place soon, India should revisit its strategy of engaging African countries under the Forum Summit through continental or regional organisations, rather than undermining the bilateral approach. India should also enhance the supply of defence equipment, the training of armed forces, and technical cooperation for African countries – which may become part of the Forum Summit – to ensure political stability and peace on the continent.

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