India and Japan can anchor a free and open Indo-Pacific
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recently concluded Indo-Pacific tour of Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand highlighted the growing breadth of India’s regional engagement. The visits reinforced New Delhi’s commitment to strengthening strategic partnerships across Southeast Asia and the Pacific in support of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). Yet among India’s expanding network of regional partners, Japan continues to occupy a uniquely important position. The momentum generated by Modi’s earlier summit with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, and the leaders’ commitment to review and strengthen the India–Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership, underscores that this relationship remains one of the strongest pillars of India’s Indo-Pacific strategy.
Within days of that summit, Japanese Defence Minister Shinjirō Koizumi and Indian Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh agreed to accelerate defence cooperation between two of the Indo-Pacific’s largest democracies, reinforcing the strategic momentum behind the partnership.
Meanwhile, diplomatic engagement between India and China has resumed, lowering tensions after years of military standoffs along the disputed border. But renewed dialogue should not be mistaken for the end of structural strategic competition. India’s long-term security still demands trusted partners like Japan.
The reality is that, despite the improving diplomatic atmosphere, China’s naval activity in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has shown no signs of abating. Around 80 per cent of the 64 Chinese research and survey vessels active in the IOR, used to scan and map seabeds, are reported to have direct links to the People’s Liberation Army.
For India, which imports around 95 per cent of its energy by sea, protecting maritime supply lines remains central to its national security.
China’s infrastructure footprint is also expanding. Its network of port access agreements stretches from Gwadar in Pakistan and Hambantota in Sri Lanka to Djibouti on the Horn of Africa. Collectively, these developments expand China’s operational reach and complicate India’s maritime security environment.
The question for New Delhi, therefore, is not whether to respond to these challenges, but how—and, crucially, with whom.
The answer lies in strengthening a partnership India has carefully cultivated over the past two decades.
India and Japan have built one of the Indo-Pacific’s most durable strategic partnerships. India endorsed Japan’s vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific in 2018, and cooperation has steadily expanded across defence, maritime security, infrastructure, resilient supply chains, critical technologies and connectivity. For both countries, FOIP is not simply a diplomatic slogan but a framework for preserving freedom of navigation, international law and regional stability.
The leaders’ decision this month to review the Special Strategic and Global Partnership reflects a shared recognition that the relationship must continue evolving to meet an increasingly contested regional environment. Their cooperation is further reinforced through the Quad, where India and Japan work alongside Australia and the United States to support a stable and rules-based Indo-Pacific.
That cooperation now spans both land and sea. The Dharma Guardian military exercise strengthens interoperability between their ground forces in jungle warfare and counterterrorism, while JIMEX, their annual naval exercise, has significantly enhanced maritime cooperation. Earlier this year, the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force and the Indian Army also conducted their first expert-level exchange on amphibious operations. In February, Japan, India and Indonesia held their first trilateral naval exercise under a framework initiated by Japan, demonstrating the growing convergence among key Indo-Pacific partners.
This partnership does not need the cover of a diplomatic thaw to justify further deepening. It stands firmly on its own strategic merits.
Defending India’s maritime interests across such a vast geography requires capable and reliable partners.
As the architect of FOIP, Tokyo is rapidly expanding its defence capabilities. Japan has allocated approximately Rs 593 billion to strengthen its stand-off strike capabilities, including Joint Strike Missiles for its fleet of F-35A fighter aircraft. It has also committed a further Rs 160 billion to unmanned reconnaissance and surveillance systems, significantly improving maritime domain awareness across the Indo-Pacific.
Alongside this sits one of the most significant changes in Japanese defence policy in decades. Tokyo has eased long-standing restrictions on defence exports while expanding its Official Security Assistance (OSA) programme, creating new opportunities for deeper capability sharing with trusted Indo-Pacific partners. Japanese Defence Minister Shinjirō Koizumi has described these initiatives as strengthening partnerships that enable countries to support one another in times of crisis.
For India, strengthening amphibious capabilities is especially important given its position astride the Strait of Malacca. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands overlook one of the world’s busiest maritime chokepoints but remain among India’s most underdeveloped strategic assets. Building the capacity to defend and project power from these islands should therefore be a national priority, particularly after recent disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz highlighted the vulnerability of critical sea lanes.
Japan, which has spent decades developing advanced maritime and amphibious capabilities, is the natural partner to support this effort.
The India-Japan partnership offers genuine cause for optimism, but the time to accelerate cooperation is now. A rules-based Indo-Pacific remains the foundation on which India’s economic growth, maritime security and strategic autonomy ultimately depend.
Normalising relations with China is prudent diplomacy. But preserving a stable regional order requires capable and like-minded partners that share responsibility for maintaining it. As India’s Indo-Pacific engagement expands from Southeast Asia to the Pacific, Japan will remain the strategic anchor around which many of these partnerships converge.
Disclaimer
Views expressed above are the author’s own.