Beyond Wir Schaffen das — toward development, peace, and European renewal

Wars continue to rage in Ukraine and the Middle East. European governments are committing tens of billions more to defence while economic uncertainty deepens at home. Energy costs remain high, industrial competitiveness is under pressure, and immigration has become one of the defining political issues across the continent.

It is against this backdrop that Germany, the economic engine of Europe, finds itself at a crossroads.

Germany is not a distant country whose political developments can be observed with detachment. It is Denmark’s immediate neighbour, our largest trading partner, and the economic heart of the European Union. What happens in Germany inevitably affects Denmark economically, politically, and socially. When German voters become increasingly frustrated with immigration policy, industrial decline, and rising living costs, these are not merely domestic German concerns. They are indicators that the European model itself is under growing strain.

Germany, moreover, is not alone. Across Northern Europe, political debates increasingly revolve around many of the same questions. Sweden, together with Germany, was among the European countries that admitted the largest numbers of asylum seekers during the 2015 refugee crisis. Today, both countries are experiencing remarkably similar political dynamics. As Sweden approaches its general election on 13 September 2026, immigration, crime, integration, and public security have become central themes of political debate. The same concerns that increasingly dominate German political discourse are also shaping Swedish newspapers, election campaigns, and public opinion. These parallels should not be dismissed as isolated national developments. Rather, they point to broader structural challenges confronting much of Europe.

Against this wider European backdrop, Germany is undergoing a profound political realignment. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) now consistently polls well ahead of the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), which once dominated German politics. This development reflects a broader continental trend in which traditional workers’ parties have steadily lost electoral support while parties critical of immigration, globalisation, and the political establishment continue to gain ground.

This shift deserves to be understood rather than dismissed.

Former Chancellor Angela Merkel’s declaration during the 2015 refugee crisis, “Wir schaffen das” (“We can do this”), became the defining slogan of Germany’s migration policy. More than a decade later, many Germans increasingly believe that the country has not managed the challenge as successfully as promised. Whether one agrees with that assessment or not, it is impossible to ignore that immigration has become one of the country’s foremost political concerns.

It is therefore unsurprising that public attention has increasingly focused on questions of crime, integration, and social cohesion.

Crime statistics have played an important role in shaping public opinion. Germany’s police crime statistics consistently show that non-German nationals are overrepresented among recorded crime suspects, including those suspected of violent crime. These figures require careful interpretation. Much of the disparity reflects demographic characteristics, since migrants are disproportionately young and male. Researchers also identify socioeconomic disadvantage and barriers to labour market integration as significant contributing factors. Crime statistics alone cannot establish a causal relationship between immigration and crime. Nevertheless, they help explain why many citizens believe the issue deserves serious political attention rather than dismissal.

Ignoring these concerns has not strengthened public confidence. On the contrary, it has contributed to its erosion.

The lesson is not that Germany should abandon humanitarian responsibility. Rather, humanitarian commitments must be accompanied by effective integration, clearly defined expectations, and policies capable of sustaining public confidence. Compassion without successful integration ultimately undermines both. At the same time, the debate over immigration cannot be separated from the broader economic anxieties that increasingly shape public sentiment.

During a recent visit to Germany, one conversation captured this broader sense of unease more vividly than any opinion poll.

A German engineer told me:

“We used to be proud that Germany made the motors while China made the wheels. Now Germany makes the wheels, while China makes the motors.”

Whether this observation is literally accurate is beside the point. The remark expressed a deeper perception that Germany is gradually losing the industrial leadership that once defined its economic success.

What stayed with me was that the conversation was not principally about immigration. It reflected a much broader concern about national decline. Immigration had become only one element of a wider anxiety regarding Germany’s future, encompassing high energy prices, declining industrial competitiveness, and the fear that Europe’s largest economy is slowly surrendering its technological leadership.

These concerns naturally give rise to a broader question: what has changed in Germany’s economic model?

Before the war in Ukraine, Germany’s industrial success depended in part upon relatively affordable energy. Since then, manufacturers have faced significantly higher production costs while competing against rapidly advancing industries in China and elsewhere. Europe must therefore ask whether its long-term prosperity can be sustained if it permanently sacrifices industrial competitiveness without establishing an equally robust alternative.

Economic competitiveness, however, is only one dimension of the challenge. The other concerns the political choices Europe is making in response to an increasingly unstable international environment.

At the same time, European politics appears increasingly to prioritise military expenditure over economic renewal.

Some of the strongest advocates of expanding military commitments have been the Baltic states and other Eastern European governments, whose security concerns are understandably shaped by geography and historical experience. Their perspective deserves respect. Nevertheless, Europe as a whole must still confront a broader strategic question: can the continent achieve lasting prosperity through a policy of permanent geopolitical confrontation?

History suggests another possibility.

India has maintained productive relationships with both Russia and the West while pursuing its own national development. Europe need not replicate India’s foreign policy, but it can learn from the principle that economic cooperation and strategic independence are not necessarily incompatible. A future European security architecture should ultimately seek stability alongside deterrence, rather than assuming permanent confrontation to be the only viable course.

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