Why America still can’t quit Pakistan

‘I love Pakistan’: A seemingly light-hearted remark by US Vice President JD Vance has triggered a surprisingly intense debate in American political circles.

Speaking during the Iran-US peace talks in Switzerland, Vance joked that the two most important people in his life were an Indian and a Pakistani. The Indian, he said, was his wife Usha Vance. The Pakistani was Pakistan Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir.

The comment quickly went viral. While many dismissed it as harmless diplomatic banter, others, particularly several in Donald Trump’s conservative support base, were far less amused.

Far-right activist and Trump supporter Laura Loomer, for instance, immediately took to X to call out how ‘Pakistan shielded al-Qaeda founder Osama Bin Laden after he masterminded the 9/11 Islamic terrorist attacks that killed 3,000 Americans’.

But beyond the social media frenzy, the controversy raises a larger question that has puzzled observers for decades: Why does the United States keep returning to Pakistan, despite repeatedly feeling disappointed, frustrated, or even betrayed by its actions?

America’s favourite gamble

The relationship between the United States and Pakistan has always been strange. America calls itself the world’s leading democracy. Pakistan has spent much of its existence under military influence. Yet Washington repeatedly finds itself drawn toward Rawalpindi.

Why? Because geography is a powerful thing. During the Cold War, Pakistan offered America a strategic foothold against the Soviet Union. During the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s, Pakistan became America’s frontline ally. Billions of dollars flowed in. Weapons and training flowed in. Military cooperation flourished. To Washington, Pakistan looked useful. To Pakistan’s military establishment, America looked profitable.

The partnership seemed perfect. Except it wasn’t. Because even while taking American money, Pakistan was often pursuing its own agenda. And that agenda did not always align with Washington’s.

The double game

The biggest example came after 9/11. When Al Qaeda attacked the United States in 2001, Washington launched the Global War on Terror. Pakistan was suddenly transformed into a major non-NATO ally. The Bush administration poured billions into Pakistan. Military aid increased. Intelligence cooperation increased.

The expectation was simple. Pakistan would help destroy the Taliban. Instead, many American officials would later accuse Pakistan of doing something very different. Publicly, Pakistan supported the US mission. Privately, elements within its security establishment were accused of maintaining ties with Taliban networks.

American soldiers were fighting Taliban militants in Afghanistan. At the same time, Washington increasingly suspected that parts of Pakistan were helping those very militants survive.

Imagine funding a war. And then discovering your ally may also be helping the enemy. That is why many former US commanders later described Pakistan as both a partner and a problem.

The Abbottabad shock

Then came the moment that changed everything. Or at least, should have. May 2011. A team of American Navy SEALs quietly entered Pakistan. Their target? Osama bin Laden. The mastermind of 9/11. The most wanted terrorist on Earth.

And where did they find him? Not in a cave. Not in some remote mountain hideout. But in Abbottabad. A garrison town. A city known for Pakistan’s military presence. Just a short distance from Pakistan’s premier military academy.

The question instantly exploded across Washington. How did the world’s most wanted terrorist live there for years? Was Pakistan unaware? Or was somebody looking the other way? Even today, that question continues to haunt the US-Pakistan relations.

Because for many Americans, Abbottabad became the ultimate symbol of betrayal.

Daniel Pearl and the cost of looking away

The frustrations did not begin with Bin Laden. Nearly a decade earlier, American journalist Daniel Pearl travelled to Pakistan while investigating extremist networks.

He was kidnapped. And later murdered. The brutality shocked the world. The case became a symbol of the dangerous ecosystem of extremism that had taken root in parts of Pakistan.

Yet despite repeated incidents involving terrorism, militancy and radical groups, Washington rarely imposed the kind of pressure many critics believed was necessary. The strategic relationship always seemed to survive. Even when trust did not.

The North Korea connection

And then there is the nuclear story. One of the most controversial chapters in Pakistan’s history. The A.Q. Khan network. Over the years, evidence emerged that Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation network had transferred sensitive technology to countries including North Korea.

For Washington, this was a nightmare scenario. North Korea was already one of America’s biggest adversaries. Yet a network linked to Pakistan had allegedly helped Pyongyang advance its nuclear ambitions. The scandal exploded globally.

But once again, Pakistan remained too strategically important for Washington to completely abandon. The relationship bent. It never broke.

Why America keeps coming back

So if history is filled with disappointments, why does America keep returning to Pakistan? The answer is brutally simple. Geography. Afghanistan. China. Iran. Counter-terrorism. Nuclear weapons. Every US administration eventually reaches the same conclusion. Pakistan is too important to ignore.

And so Washington convinces itself that this time will be different. This time, the generals will cooperate. This time, the partnership will work. This time, Pakistan’s interests will align with America’s. Sometimes they do. Often they don’t. But the cycle continues.

Which is why JD Vance’s remarks have many in America bristling. Not because of one joke. Not because of one meeting. But because they signal something larger. A familiar pattern. Another chapter in America’s long-running belief that Pakistan can be a reliable strategic partner.

The flip side

But there is another side to this story. What if Pakistan is the one that gets disappointed? Or perhaps more importantly, what if America simply moves on, once again?

Pakistan is useful to Washington today. It helped facilitate contacts during the Iran crisis. It offers geographic access, intelligence channels, and a degree of influence in a volatile region stretching from the Gulf to Afghanistan. For the moment, that gives Islamabad renewed relevance.

But history also shows that America’s interest in Pakistan rises and falls with its strategic needs. Once the Soviet Union collapsed, Pakistan’s importance faded. After the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, Washington’s attention drifted elsewhere. Each time, Pakistan found itself scrambling to remain relevant.

That is the uncomfortable reality Islamabad rarely acknowledges. America’s embrace is often transactional, not permanent. The same Washington that is praising Pakistan today could deprioritise it tomorrow if the Iran file stabilises, if regional dynamics change, or if larger concerns, such as competition with China, begin to dominate the agenda once again.

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